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The courts are one of the most fundamental 
institutions where power is contested in a 
constitutional democracy. A functioning and an 
independent judiciary can restrain and hold the 
executive accountable together with other state 
institutions, as well as political and economic elites. 
A robust judiciary is imperative in establishing rule-
based governance. In November 2007, the 
subordinate judiciary in Bangladesh was formally 
separated from the executive by bringing in force 
the main findings of the case of Masdar Hossain.  In 
this context, the Institute of Governance Studies 
(IGS), by way of this Policy Note, aims to provide a 
number of policy recommendations, which could 
further strengthen the independence of the 
1judiciary.  This Policy Note focuses on four issues: 
Issue 1: Independence - the extent to which the 
judiciary is autonomous from the executive's 
control 
Issue 2: Accountability - the extent to which the 
judiciary can be held responsible for its decisions 
and actions
Issue 3: Efficiency - the internal capacity of the 
judiciary to carry out its objectives
Issue 4: Effectiveness - the extent to which the 
judiciary has achieved its objectives/mandates
We believe that if the policy recommendations are 
fully implemented, they would assist both the 
higher and subordinate judiciary to perform 
collectively as an institution of accountability by 
resolving disputes. 
1. INDEPENDENCE
1.1  Appointment of Judges
Article 95(1) of the Constitution provides that the 
judges of the Supreme Court will be appointed by 
the President of the Republic. While the 
constitutional provision was amended in 1975 to 
remove the explicit requirement that the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh be 
consulted as part of the process of appointing 
judges, successive Governments have continued 
to comply with the convention of consultation with 
the Chief Justice. This convention was finally 
discarded. However, a recent landmark decision of 
the Supreme Court has re-asserted the role of the 
2Chief Justice.  Such a decision has to be seen in the 
context of recent political history of Bangladesh, 
where political affiliation has played a significant 
role in appointments of high officials, including 
judges. Appointment of a compliant Chief Justice 
may not, therefore, act as a significant safeguard in 
appointing judges. 
Policy Recommendation: Form a Supreme 
Judicial Commission which will identify 
appropriate persons for appointment as judges 
and recommend their names to the President.
 
Commission Ordinance, 2008 was promulgated 
and a nine-member Supreme Judicial Commission 
First, the judges could be appointed by the 
Supreme Judicial Commission as it was done 
during the tenure of the last Caretaker Government 
(2007-2009). In 2008 the Supreme Judicial
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1 IGS organised an international workshop on April 15 and 16 and an informal colloquium of judges of the Supreme Court on June 14 
of 2009 to facilitate a deliberative process to formulate policy recommendations. This policy note is based on the workshop and 
colloquium discussions, literature review and an empirical study conducted for the purpose.
2 Idrisur Rahman v. Bangladesh 60 DLR 714. On July 17, 2008, the High Court (HC) ordered the government to make permanent the 
appointment of the ten judges, who served as Additional Judges but were not confirmed during the BNP-led government, despite 
the recommendations of the then Chief Justice. In that judgment the HC made it clear that the recommendation of the Chief Justice 
will be binding on the President.
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headed by the Chief Justice was formed.  It was 
given the task to recommend, after selection, two 
competent persons against each vacant post to the 
President with a view to appointing one of them as 
the judge of the Supreme Court. However, the 
Ordinance became ineffective as it was not placed 
before the present Parliament within the stipulated 
time. 
If in the future a commission is formed again with 
similar terms of reference as the previous one such 
a commission could be chaired by the Chief 
Justice, and also include as its members the senior-
most Justice of the Appellate Division, the senior-
most Justice of the High Court Division, the 
Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, 
two or more practicing advocates from the 
Appellate and High Court Divisions, and the Heads 
of different constitutional bodies, such as, the 
Public Service Commission, the Office of the 
3Comptroller and Auditor General.
The Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court 
could be given the responsibility of preparing the 
initial list of potential candidates. The Registrar will 
prepare the list of names by reviewing the Annual 
Confidential Reports (ACR) of the judges of the 
subordinate courts.  The Registrar will also have to 
identify eligible practicing lawyers from the 
Supreme Court by way of consultation with the 
Chief Justice and the judges of the Supreme Court. 
On receiving the list of names from the Registrar of 
the Supreme Court the future commission will 
scrutinise and put together a shortlist of candidates 
(say three names for each vacant position) which it 
will then submit to the President for appointment as 
judges of the High Court Division and Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court. If any of the 
nominees on the shortlist is unacceptable to the 
President, the Commission will be notified. The 
Commission will provide more names and the 
President will then decide from the additional 
names.
Second, judges could be appointed by a collegium 
of judges, as it is done in India. The collegium would 
include the Chief Justice and four senior-most 
judges of the Appellate Division. The collegium will 
select and submit a list of candidates to the 
President. If any of the candidates is unacceptable, 
the President will notify the collegium and the latter 
will provide a supplementary list from which 
appointments will be made.
However, whether it is a commission or a collegium 
it will be important to seek the opinion of Supreme 
Court Justices about the competency of the 
candidates being considered for appointment as 
judges. A candidate may be appointed only if two-
third of judges consulted is satisfied with the 
person's competency. It needs to be emphasised 
that the evaluation should be based on pre-
determined criteria rather than personal and 
political attributes.  This is to avoid lobbying and 
partisan appointment. The process of appointment 
should be made as transparent as possible, for 
example, by putting the candidates' educational 
and legal records in public.
A third option could be a hybrid of the first two.  The 
Registrar of the Supreme Court, upon request from 
the Chief Justice or the commission or the 
collegium could advertise for suitable candidates 
who would meet the requirements of Article 95(2) 
(c) of the Constitution. The aspirant candidates will 
submit information, as stipulated in the 
advertisement. The Registrar will circulate the 
information received to the members of the 
commission or collegium. A sub-committee of the 
commission or collegium may sift through the 
applications received and draw up a shortlist.  
Once the Commission or collegium has approved 
the shortlist, the names will be made public at the 
time of submission of those names to the President 
for appointment as judges.
1.2 Selection Criteria for Judges
Article 95 (2) of the Constitution provides the 
eligibility criteria for Supreme Court judges: a 
person has to be a citizen of Bangladesh and either 
a Supreme Court advocate having at least ten 
years' standing or a judicial officer who has held 
judicial office for a period of not less than ten years. 
The eligibility provision is very broad; experience 
refers to years of being admitted to practice at the 
3  In South Africa, The Judicial Service Commission consists of - (a) the Chief Justice, who presides at meetings of the Commission; 
(b) the President of the Constitutional Court; (c) one Judge President designated by the Judges President; (d) the Cabinet member 
responsible for the administration of justice, or an alternate designated by that Cabinet member; (e) two practicing advocates 
nominated from within the advocates' profession  to represent the profession as a whole, and appointed by the President; (f) two 
practicing attorneys nominated from within the attorneys' profession to represent the profession as a whole, and appointed by the 
President; (g) one teacher of law designated by the law teachers at South African universities; (h) six persons designated by the 
National Assembly from among its members, at least three of whom must be members of opposition parties represented in the 
Assembly; (i) four permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces designated together by the Council with a supporting 
vote of at least six provinces;  (j) four persons designated by the President as head of the national executive, after consulting the 
leaders of all the parties in the National Assembly; and (k) when considering matters specifically relating to a provincial or local 
division of the High Court, the Judge President of that division and the Premier, or an alternate designated by the Premier of the 
province concerned.
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4 According to the Rules of the Bar, a lawyer is allowed to practice law at the High Court only after completion of two years of legal 
practice at the subordinate courts, during which period the lawyer had to contest at least 100 legal suits. Moreover, the lawyer has 
to satisfy the judges that s/he has the capacity to do so. After practicing law at the High Court for two years, a lawyer can then apply 
to the Chief Justice to be allowed to practice at the Appellate Division. Again the lawyer had to contest at least 100 legal suits. The 
judges of the Supreme Court go through his/her record and decide whether that lawyer has the ability to practice at the Appellate 
Division.
5  This opinion can be sought in a prescribed form. In the first part of the form, the High Court judges will decide whether the candidate 
is good enough to be appointed as a judge. This form may have three options- 'yes', 'no' and 'I do not know this person'. If the 
answer is 'yes' or 'no', then the High Court judges will move to the second part where s/he will comment about legal performance of 
the candidate.
6 For instance, in 2005, when two national newspapers reported that an additional judge of the High Court, who was serving his 
probationary term had tampered his law degree the High Court instead of inquiring the veracity of these claims first, convicted 
editors, publishers and three reporters for contempt of court. Moreover, journalists were barred from contacting judges directly.
Bar or on the bench, and not necessarily referring to 
handling of complex legal matters and thus 
allowing individuals with shallow legal experience 
to take on the onerous task of judgeship.
Policy Recommendation: Determine specific 
eligibility criteria for judges.
Although Article 95 (2) (c) states that the Parliament 
can determine other qualifications for judges, so far 
no law has prescribed such criteria. The following 
criteria are suggested for consideration:
Advocates practicing law before the Appellate 
Division may be given priority in case of 
4appointment as judges.
The appointing authority should consider 
distinguished jurists who have worked for at 
least fifteen years in the judicial or legal field for 
appointment as judges of the Supreme Court.
In appointing members of the Bar to the Bench the 
appointing authority can request the Supreme 
Court judges to review the performance of the 
selected lawyers. Upon receiving information 
related to matters such as the number and nature of 
cases conducted, overall performance on the court 
cases, and level of professional standard the final 
5decision can be taken.
1.3 Financial and Administrative Independence
According to Article 88 of the Constitution, the 
salary of the Supreme Court judges and associated 
administrative expenses are charged on the 
Consolidated Fund and not subject to 
parliamentary sanction. But as 'administrative 
expenses' are not defined, the Ministry of Finance 
(MoF) can regulate such allocation in the name of 
financial discipline owing to its inherent authority to 
ensure financial discipline of the government. This 
practice has severely undermined the effective 
functioning of the judiciary. Moreover, a somewhat 
hostile attitude of the government administration 
towards the judiciary has resulted in delayed or lack 
of response to requests from the judiciary for 
assistance in terms of human and other basic 
resources. For example, while many new 
magistrates joined the subordinate courts in 2008, 
!
!
there were no new court rooms for them to work in 
and had to share court rooms and couldn't hold 
sessions regularly. The judges had to share 
stenographers and were often not provided with 
the most rudimentary equipment (such as pens). 
The Supreme Court judges also reported similar 
administrative problems in their work.
Policy Recommendation: Establish a separate 
secretariat under the supervision of the Supreme 
Court.
Administrative secretariat can be established in 
two phases. In the short-term, the Office of the 
Registrar of the Supreme Court can be given some 
new responsibilities. The Registrar's Office should 
identify, analyse and submit the requirements of the 
whole of the judiciary to the Ministry of Law, Justice 
and Parliamentary Affairs (MoLJPA).  The MoLJPA 
should act as a 'post office' and convey the 
requirements to the relevant ministries.  
Subsequently, those ministries will provide 
assistance to the judiciary through the MoLJPA. In 
case of financial matters, the judiciary will prepare 
and submit its budget to the MoF through the 
MoLJPA and the MoF through the same channel 
will allocate a budget for the judiciary as a whole.
In the medium to long term, a separate law may be 
enacted to facilitate the formation of a separate 
secretariat under the control of the Supreme Court. 
On the enactment of that Act, the judiciary will be in 
control of its financial and administrative activities 
through its own secretariat.
2.1  Contempt of Court 
The law of contempt of court that has developed in 
Bangladesh and other parts of the sub-continent is 
more suppressive than that found in the United 
Kingdom and other common law countries.  The 
current legislation, the Contempt of Court Act 
1926, fails to strike a balance between protection of 
judiciary and freedom of expression.  It is generally 
felt that the 1926 Act has been used more to protect 
6judges from justified criticism and public scrutiny.  
According to this Act, reports and comments on 
2. ACCOUNTABILITY
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7 According to the Contempt of Court Ordinance, 2008 (promulgated during the tenure of the last Caretaker Government and then 
declared as invalid by the High Court) “violation of any verdict, decree, order, writ or warrant of a court, campaigning ill propaganda 
against any judge concerned on the subject during discharging responsibilities as judge, affecting the normal course of trial 
process willingly or by writing or verbally or in sign or indication or through any visible medium will be treated as contempt of court”. 
8 The Bangalore Code of Judicial Conduct is a set of principles which was designed to provide the judiciary a framework for 
regulating judicial conduct in the areas of independence, impartiality, integrity, proprietary, competence and diligence. It was 
adopted by the Judicial Group on Strengthening Judicial Integrity at the Round Table Meeting of Chief Justices held at the Peace 
Palace, The Hague, November 25-26, 2002. Its main features have been described in the 'Efficiency' section.
9  Code of Conduct For The Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh is effective from the 7th day of May, 2000. The 14 point Code 
stipulates that any act of a judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh whether in official or personal capacity, which erodes the 
credibility and independence has to be avoided.
10 Bangladesh Judicial Service (Posting, Promotion, Grant of Leave, Control, Discipline and other Condition of Service) Rules, 2007, 
promulgated during the tenure of the last Caretaker Government suggested that, “With necessary adjustments (Mutatis Mutandis) 
Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1985 would be applicable in disciplinary matters against Judges of 
Subordinate Courts. In the whole process, consultation with the Supreme Court is compulsory”. Personnel matters of the judicial 
officers are still conducted by The Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1979. So far, no adjustment has been made in the existing 
Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1979 and Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1985 to make them 
applicable for the judicial service.
court proceedings, judge's personal conduct and 
criticism of verdicts are treated as contempt. 
Potential penalties include fine or imprisonment for 
a term which might extend to six months. 
Policy Recommendation: Replace the existing 
Contempt of Court Act with a new, dynamic one.
The new contempt of court act should provide a 
7proper definition of 'contempt of court' . It should 
allow the press to report and comment on 'normal' 
court proceedings and functions. At the same time, 
a judge's personal conduct should be brought 
under public scrutiny. In order to define the proper 
code of conduct for the judges, the principles of 
8Bangalore Code of Conduct  may be applied. 
Constructive criticism of judgment should be 
allowed, i.e. the media will be able to discuss the 
legal issues contained in the judgment and its 
possible consequences. 
2.2  Performance Evaluation 
Presently, the performance of subordinate court 
judges is evaluated by way of Annual Confidential 
Reports (ACRs). It is commonly held that the 
process has failed to encourage accountability and 
is not considered to be an effective supervision 
mechanism. ACRs encourage tadbir (lobbying) 
with subordinate judges being over-cautious and 
meek in the hope of receiving glowing reviews from 
senior judges. ACRs are also susceptible to 
political interference as subordinate court judges 
feel that their ACRs would contain negative 
remarks if they fail to tow a particular political line.
Policy Recommendation: Modernise the ACR.
The ACR process is in need of modernisation.  The 
ACR could be divided in two parts: the first part to 
assess the subordinate court judge's personality 
traits, i.e. honesty and integrity, sense of 
responsibility, self-confidence, discipline, conduct, 
obedience to superior judges, level of cooperation, 
ability of decision making, etc. The second part is to 
include an analysis of judges' legal performance, 
that is, information about the number of cases 
decided upon, the quality of judgments (whether 
the judgments have followed the law and relevant 
precedent), timeliness, court management, time 
taken to deliver judgments, interaction with litigants 
and lawyers in court, among other issues.
In order to make ACR process transparent reasons 
and evidence need to be provided.  Evaluating 
judge has to cite references of at least five 
judgments of a particular judge to justify his/her 
decision in the ACR and explain why those 
judgments are considered to be particularly 
extraordinary or unsatisfactory. 
2.3  Issues of Personnel Management
The judges of the Supreme Court are guided by the 
9Code of Conduct,  which provides a very detailed 
guidance in terms of how judges of the Supreme 
Court should conduct themselves. Also, according 
to Article 116 of the Constitution, the personnel 
matters of the subordinate courts are controlled by 
the President (the executive), in consultation with 
the Supreme Court. At present, different rules and 
regulations formulated for the civil service 
personnel are also applicable to subordinate court 
10judges.  However, these rules were specifically 
designed for the officials of the Administrative 
Services and define misconduct from the 
perspective of the civil service. A complete revision 
of the conduct rules and a re-definition of 
'misconduct' are required for the judiciary. So far no 
steps have been taken to readjust these rules for 
the judicial officers. At the same time, the existing 
transfer and promotion policies allow the MoLJPA 
to play a significant role in the posting, promotion 
and transfer of the subordinate court judges.
Policy Recommendation:  Formulate new rules 
to conduct the personnel matters of subordinate 
courts.
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11  The provisions may include, they will not be able to serve in a fiduciary role, except for the estate of a family member; financial and 
business dealings which may interfere with judicial independence will be prohibited; “prohibition of judicial bribery, whether the 
beneficiary of the gift or advantage is the judge or a member of his/her family”; authorised gifts and benefits, received by them will 
remain subject to law and they will be legally bound to make public disclosure of the gifts and benefits received; “A judge shall make 
such financial disclosures and pay all such taxes as are required by law” (Autheman 2004).
provide the judges with a broader outlook including 
knowledge of contemporary international legal 
issues and necessary social skills. 
Furthermore, once judges are appointed to the 
Supreme Court, they normally sit with senior judges 
and the training they get is through 'on-the-job' 
experience. The quality of this informal training 
varies massively depending on the ability and 
willingness of the presiding judges.  A systematic 
and appropriate 'sharing of learning' programmes 
need to be constituted for higher judiciary to meet 
the demands of the globalised world. 
Policy Recommendation: Ensure effective and 
dynamic training facilities for the judges.
The quality of training provided by JATI should be 
improved. A training need- assessment of the 
subordinate court judges could be undertaken 
immediately, which will identify the areas of laws 
(such as, cyber space, money laundering, ethics, 
arbitration and conciliation) for curriculum 
development and training. JATI should also plan 
and implement a continuous point-based training 
programme for the subordinate court judges.  
Another interesting and innovative mode of 
orientation for the judges of the subordinate courts 
could be a form of 'apprenticeship' for the newly-
recruited by placing them with the judges of the 
Supreme Court for a designated period of time.  
Similar to the system of 'pupillage' for newly 
qualified lawyers when they spend a period of time 
with senior lawyers the newly recruited subordinate 
judges could be assigned to different High Court 
judges. They could work as 'Research Assistants' 
of the judges and help them with academic 
research, drafting of legal instruments, and writing 
of judgments. After this initial phase of 
'apprenticeship', they can then receive further 
training at JATI.  
If this particular form of training is allowed, the new 
recruits will get to learn about the different legal 
issues and how judgments are written and 
generally increase their confidence and 
competence in matters related to law. On the other 
hand, the judges of the High Court Division, who are 
severely in need of skilled human resource, could 
benefit tremendously from the service of the newly 
recruited judges. This would also develop a 
working relationship between the judges of the 
Supreme and the subordinate courts. 
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002 
provides some guidance on the formulation of new 
rules. Thereby, the proposed rules should provide, 
among others, specific regulations related to the 
11professional conduct of judicial officials.   
Moreover, separate transfer and promotion policies 
should be developed for the subordinate court 
judges which will bring them under the control of 
the Supreme Court.
2.4  Other Measures
 initiate inquiry and submit a report to the 
President. The President, on considering the 
content of the report, may direct the Supreme 
Judicial Council, a disciplinary body established by 
the Constitution, to inquire into the matter, and to 
take necessary action. 
In order to ensure effective performance evaluation 
of judges and to increase accountability the Chief 
Justice could fix deadline for judgments to be 
delivered by judges of higher and subordinate 
judiciary. He should activate the provision of the 
Right to Information Act 2009 by making judgments 
and orders public by putting them on the website. 
Finally, the Chief Justice should ensure widespread 
circulation of the annual report published by the 
Supreme Court.
3.1 Training
The Government of Bangladesh has established 
the Judicial Administration Training Institute (JATI) 
in accordance with the Judicial Administration 
Training Institute Act 1995. Under the current 
training policy, JATI runs a 60-day basic course for 
newly appointed Assistant Judges, 21-day courses 
(and at times, 3-day short courses) for Senior 
Assistant Judges, Joint District Judges and District 
Judges. However, the quality of training is not 
satisfactory as it lacks dynamism and fails to 
It is important to ensure that the judges of the 
Supreme Court adhere to the Code of Conduct. A 
cell could be established at the Supreme Court for 
this purpose. 
Policy Recommendation:  Esabl ish a 
'Grievance Cell' at the Supreme Court under the 
supervision of the Chief Justice.
Any aggrieved person can complain to the 
'Grievance Cell'. On receiving complaints, the Cell 
should
3. EFFICIENCY
Institutions of Accountability: The Judiciary Policy Note06
For the judges of the Supreme Court the JATI could 
organise annual colloquiums/conferences 
following the Sri Lankan experience where it will 
invite judges from home and abroad. These 
colloquiums would be an appropriate venue for 
judges to share experiences and exchange views 
about issues relating to substantive areas of law as 
well as judicial administration and ethics. This 
informal mode of interaction can deal with the 
reluctance of senior judges in receiving training in 
formal settings.
3.2  Deputation
In Bangladesh, because of the absence of a strong 
ingrained culture of judicial independence, 
deputation of judicial officers in various ministries 
has become a critical concern. In principle, the 
practice of deputation mars the independence of 
the judiciary as it brings a number of judicial officers 
directly under the control of executive offices. It is 
felt that judicial officers should not be placed in a 
position which would compromise their prospect of 
future promotion or prestige vis a vis the executive.  
Policy Recommendation:  Phase out 
deputation of judges in other ministries.
Phasing out deputation should concentrate on two 
intertwined issues. First, the ministries should build 
their own legal capacity so that they do not have to 
borrow officials from the subordinate courts. 
Second, the existing incentive structures need to 
be modified to discourage deputation of 
subordinate court judges. One of the reasons for 
deputation is the need of the executive to have legal 
expertise in different ministries. The ministries can 
adopt two possible policies to satisfy their legal 
requirements: first, they can directly recruit legal 
professionals who will provide necessary advice. 
This may require changes in existing recruitment 
rules. Second, the government can introduce a 
separate cadre for the judicial officers who will be 
directly appointed as law officers in ministries by 
the Public Service Commission through a 
competitive process.  Specific and specialised 
training could be given to those persons according 
to the specific needs of that particular 
Ministry/Department. These officials will have no 
relationship with the judiciary.
Policy Recommendation: Formulate new rules 
to provide adequate promotion opportunities for 
judicial officers
12 In public universities, in case of promotion, a number of eligibility criteria have been determined. Accordingly, a teacher of a 
department can apply for promotion if s/he fulfils these certain criteria. His/her promotion is allowed even when there is no vacant 
position at that level.
The subordinate court judges are often interested in 
being deputed to different ministries because of 
their limited promotion opportunities within the 
judiciary and their less attractive incentive package 
and administrative facilities. In order to solve this 
problem, new promotion rules should be 
formulated, which will define certain eligibility 
criteria for promotion (e.g. marks obtained in ACR, 
length of experience, cases handled, years of 
active service etc.). If a judge fulfils these criteria, 
s/he will be promoted even if there is lack of 
adequate vacant posts. In such circumstances, the 
promotion policy of public universities could be 
followed; qualified judges may continue with their 
existing duties but will receive pay and benefit 
12according to the promoted position.
3.3  Low Salary 
Comparatively speaking, the judges in Bangladesh 
are not receiving an attractive incentive package.  
The present level of salary and other benefits fail to 
attract competent lawyers in joining the judiciary.  
As in any other country a successful advocate can 
earn a handsome income from his or her practice, 
and, if one has to take a massive cut in income by 
becoming a judge then there is little incentive.  
Consequently, only a certain category of advocates 
remain potential candidates for judicial 
appointments. A raise in the level of salary (as part 
of the whole incentive package) of judges, which 
would be commensurate to the existing living 
standards of other professionals, may attract a 
different, and hopefully a better, category of 
lawyers into the judiciary. 
In the subordinate courts, the situation is even 
worse.  Entry level judges were paid a salary scale 
of Tk. 6800 (now Tk. 11000 as per Bangladesh 
Judicial Service Pay Scale, 2009), which was 
abysmally too low to attract meritorious law 
graduates into the service. While recently the 
process of recruiting judicial magistrates appears 
to have attracted a number of meritorious students, 
but due to low level pay scale as many as 49 entry 
level judges have already left the service and many 
more are thinking of doing the same (IGS 2009). 
Policy Recommendation: Implement the 
recommendation of the Judicial  Pay 
Commission with immediate effect.
Over the last 100 years, the relative salary levels of 
the Supreme Court/East Bengal High Court judges 
have fallen drastically. The present salary structure 
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Second, number of filing cases should be 
decreased. For instance, the land related laws 
could be revised and land management be 
simplified. Introduction of ICT in land management 
will have a positive impact in reducing the number 
of filing cases. Providing decided cases 
electronically at the judges' fingertips would reduce 
the number of cases admitted by the High Court 
where principles have been established by earlier 
decisions.
Third, administrative hindrances should be 
reduced. For example, every police station could 
have an investigation unit which will keep and 
update records of all the cases pending in the court 
within its jurisdiction and will submit witnesses 
when necessary. When an investigation officer of a 
police station is transferred, s/he will leave a full 
departing report for his/her succeeding officer.
Until the formal separation of the judiciary from the 
executive the judiciary remained in a vulnerable 
position, where the lower courts were controlled by 
the executive and the appointment procedure of 
judges to the Supreme Court depended to a large 
extent on political allegiance. However, the 
separation of the judiciary has not met people's 
expectations in terms of its independent 
functioning. The subordinate courts, despite being 
under the control of the Supreme Court, continue 
its dependence on the executive which has 
undermined its effective functioning. Measures 
designed to insulate the judiciary from political 
interference have not thus ensured the impartiality 
of the institution due to its administrative 
dependence. At the same time no significant 
change has been brought about in the higher 
judiciary. In this policy note, we have proposed 
certain measures which may help the judiciary to 
become an independent entity.
Autheman, V. (2004). Global Best Practices, 
Judicial Integrity Standards and Consensus 
Principles, The Rule of Law white paper series. 
IFES.
Institute of Governance Studies (2009). Institutions 
of Accountability: The Judiciary. Background 
Paper, Dhaka:  BRAC University. 
CONCLUSION
FOR FURTHER READING:
of judges is significantly low compared to other 
13South Asian countries.  Therefore, a massive 
increase in salary of Supreme Court Judges is 
necessary.
4.1  Excessive Case Backlog
In Bangladesh, one of the major problems of the 
justice sector is delayed dispensation of justice due 
to huge backlog of cases.  Sometimes it takes 20 to 
25 years for a case to be resolved. According to 
average rate of disposal of civil cases in the last five 
years, it would take two years and nine months to 
dispose of all pending cases if there are no new 
cases during this period. On the other hand, 
according to average rate of disposal of criminal 
cases in the last five years, it would take one year 
and ten months to dispose of all pending cases if 
there are no new cases. 
Three factors are responsible for the existing 
backlog: (i) structural deficiency, for example, 
shortage of judges, inadequate number of court 
houses; (ii) legal and procedural complexity and 
ineffective case management system, for example, 
80 per cent of court cases have their genesis in land 
disputes, and the reason behind this huge number 
of cases is the outdated land laws and an 
ineffective land management system; and (iii) weak 
judicial administration, for example, frequent 
transfer of Investigation Officers (IOs) of the Police 
Department, no financial allowances given to 
witnesses summoned to give evidence. 
Policy Recommendation: Adopt a holistic 
approach.
In order to resolve these issues three measures 
could be taken simultaneously. First, steps should 
be taken to resolve the structural deficiencies of the 
judiciary. This includes appointment of sufficient 
number of judges at both subordinate and higher 
courts and court modernisation through 
simplification of such procedures as payment of 
fees and stamp duties, and application procedures. 
Other means of modernisation could be application 
of information and communication technology 
(ICT) in the area of listing cases and submission of 
documents at least in the higher courts. 
4.  Effectiveness
13  A comparison of the salary of Supreme Court judges of Bangladesh with that of India and Pakistan is given in the following table:
Position Pay in Pakistan (Rs)* Pay in India (Rs)* Pay in Bangladesh (Tk.)*
Chief Justice 259,838 100,000 56,000
Justice (Appellate Division) 245,457 90,000 53,100
Justice (High Court Division) 231,563 80,000 49,000
*per month as at April 2010
www.igs-bracu.ac.bd
Institute of Governance Studies
House No. 40/6, North Avenue, Gulshan 2, Dhaka-1212, Bangladesh
Tel: +88 01199 810380, +88 02 8810306, 8810320, 8810326
Fax: +88 02 8832542; Email: igs-info@bracuniversity.ac.bd
www.igs-brac.ac.bd
The Institute of Governance Studies, established 
in 2005, is affiliated with BRAC University, a 
private institution of higher education in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh. The University, established in 2001, 
has a goal to provide a high quality, broad - based 
education with a focus on professional 
development to equip students with the 
knowledge and skills necessary for leading the 
country in its quest for development.
The mission of the University - to promote national 
development process through the creation of a 
centre of excellence in higher education that is 
responsive to society's needs - is consistent with 
the long-term development objectives of its 
sponsoring institution, BRAC.
